Author: Nikodem Łojewski

Reviewers: Magdalena Pawlik and Szymon Więk

Current U.S. Policies Towards Cuba

Since the beginning of the year, Cuba has been grappling with numerous measures of pressure from the U.S., beginning on January 3 with the kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. Shortly after that event, the U.S. launched an ongoing oil blockade against Cuba, further deepening the country’s long-standing economic crisis. This decision was driven by an attempt to force political change in Cuba. Above all, fuel shortages caused regular disruptions to energy supplies, often lasting up to 30 hours. In reality, eight months after that event, not much has changed. However, the U.S. did not stop there and, in the following months, significantly expanded its sanctions. As early as January, the U.S. attempted to impose secondary tariffs targeting Cuba’s allies, which were ultimately blocked by the Supreme Court. In May, the U.S. began imposing further sanctions, initially targeting the Cuban regime through secondary sanctions and subsequently extending measures to officials, the ruling elite, and key Cuban business entities. The entity most affected by these measures was Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A. (GAESA), the Cuban military-controlled business conglomerate that manages key sectors of the island’s economy, including tourism, trade, and finance. Depending on the estimate, GAESA controls between 40 and 70 per cent of the Cuban economy. Also in May, the U.S. imposed sanctions on the Cuban mining company Moa Nickel S.A. (MNSA) for allegedly providing financial support to the authorities in Havana. These measures contributed to the withdrawal of foreign companies, a 60 per cent drop in tourism between January and May 2026, and rising prices. Furthermore, Cuba is facing shortages of medicines, while domestic food production continues to decline. Despite the Cuban government presenting a reform package in June 2026, further sanctions targeting similar sectors were imposed on the grounds that the proposed reforms were merely superficial.

Why is Cuba important to the U.S.?

As stated on the official website of the U.S. Department of State: “The United States seeks a stable, prosperous, and free country for the Cuban people. The United States pursues limited engagement with Cuba that advances our national interests and empowers the Cuban people while restricting economic practices that disproportionately benefit the Cuban government or its military, intelligence, or security agencies at the expense of the Cuban people. The U.S. government seeks to promote human rights, religious freedom, and democracy, encourages the development of telecommunications and the internet in Cuba, supports the growth of Cuba’s nascent private sector and civil society, and engages in areas that advance the interests of the United States and the Cuban people”. This naturally raises the question “why a country with a population just over 11 million people and holding only a distant 59th place in GDP worldwide remains strategically important to the U.S.?”. At first glance, if a state has neighboring countries, it is generally in every state’s interest to maintain stable relations with them. In Cuba’s case, however, the island’s strategic location is only one part of the broader geopolitical picture

Situated at the maritime crossroads of the Americas, Cuba represents a major security concern due to its ties with major U.S. foreign adversaries such as Russia and China. Following the U.S. operation in Venezuela, their cooperation has evolved, what can be concluded based on a joint seminar held in Havana in the middle of 2026. The outcome of the meeting emphasized both countries’ support for Cuba, portraying their cooperation with Havana as part of a broader anti-Western alignment. Because of this, it is not surprising that Washington tends to view China and Russia as part of the same concern regarding hostile powers operating in its vicinity. However, it appears that China’s involvement in Cuba is more significant in this regard.

Although Russia offers friendly votes at the United Nations and Russian diplomats visited China on January 21 after Putin affirmed that Russia “will continue to provide assistance to our Cuban friends, standing in solidarity with their determination to defend their sovereignty and independence by all means” this is unlikely to change Cuba’s trajectory. On other fronts, Russia’s assistance has been sporadic. For example, no tanker reached Cuba for three months after the Venezuelan cutoff, and when a Russian ship carrying crude oil finally docked in Matanzas in late March, it happened only because the U.S. allowed it. Subsequent cargo shipments turned back without even testing the U.S. blockade. On the other hand, there is China, whose aid has included large quantities of food (e.g., 60,000 tons of rice delivered on January 20 and six shipments of food by air in November last year) as well as financial assistance amounting to USD 80 million, approved by Chinese President Xi Jinping. What’s more, over the past year, China’s involvement in Cuba’s energy sector has rapidly expanded. As a result, the share of solar-generated electricity has increased from around 6 percent to more than 20 percent. All of this provides Cuba with a lifeline that the U.S. oil blockade cannot break.

This state of affairs is concerning for the United States, not only because it allows Cuba to resist for longer, but also because China’s growing influence creates opportunities for Beijing to increase Cuba’s dependence on China, which could result in a strategic advantage over Washington. China would not only benefit economically but could also potentially conduct intelligence operations against the United States thanks to the closer proximity.

Is further escalation possible?

Despite U.S. actions spanning more than six months and the massive crisis in Cuba, the political situation in the country hasn’t changed radically, and it looks like the U.S. cannot apply its “regime change” policy in Cuba without taking more decisive steps. Recently, CBS News stated that Pentagon officials were exploring the possibility of military action against Cuba. Nevertheless, we should view this as harsh rhetoric and a scare tactic rather than actual plans for an attack. Even though an invasion of Cuba would be the most effective way to achieve U.S. objectives there – and would likely unfold similarly to the operation in Venezuela earlier this year – it would also carry significant risks. Cuba could inflict far greater long-term damage on the U.S., even after a successful regime change.

First of all, as written in Blaise Malley’s article for Responsible Statecraft: “Cuba’s military doctrine has long assumed it cannot defeat the United States in a conventional war. Instead, it emphasises territorial defence and guerrilla warfare designed to make any occupation costly and prolonged.” This means that an occupation of Cuba could resemble the most difficult parts of other U.S. wars, e.g. the war in Afghanistan. Another important risk could be a potential migration crisis towards Florida due to the state’s close proximity to Cuba, which isn’t something that, especially President Trump, would want for his citizens. That said, the most likely scenario for U.S.-Cuba relations is the continuation of the oil blockade and sanctions, although it is very unlikely that economic warfare can change anything on its own, considering the endurance of the Cuban regime. The U.S. will try to keep Cuba under pressure until it is certain that economic coercive measures have proved insufficient – then limited military action can be expected. Yet, for now, nothing can be taken for granted.

Sources:

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[2] Council on Foreign Affairs, U.S.-Cuba Relations Explained, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/us-cuba-relations, [dostęp: 28.07.2026 r.]

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[5]  Key West, Key West to Cuba, https://keywestcustomcharter.com/key-west-to-cuba/, [dostęp: 28.07.2026 r.]

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[7] M. A. Kuo, The China Factor in Cuba-US tensions, https://thediplomat.com/2026/07/the-china-factor-in-cuba-us-tensions/, [dostęp: 28.07.2026 r.]

[8] B. Malley, What a US war with Cuba would really look like, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/us-invasion-cuba/, [dostęp: 28.07.2026 r.]

[9] P. Meriguet, China and Russia reaffirm commitment to Cuba, https://peoplesdispatch.org/2026/01/23/china-and-russia-reaffirm-commitment-to-cuba/, [dostęp: 28.07.2026 r.]

[10] U.S. Departament of State, U.S. – Cuba relations, https://2021-2025.state.gov/countries-areas/cuba/, [dostęp: 28.07.2026 r.]

[11] Worldometer, PKB według krajów (2026) – MFW, https://www.worldometers.info/pl/pkb/pkb-wedlug-krajow/, [dostęp: 28.07.2026 r.]