For decades, Denmark was a beacon of Nordic egalitarianism: high living standards, low corruption, solid public services and a deeply rooted social contract. In recent years, however, dissonance has emerged. Behind the country’s well-oiled welfare system lies an architecture of migration policy that raises critical questions about national identity, integration and human rights. Denmark’s evolving migration model reveals the tensions at the heart of European liberal democracy: the desire to protect national cohesion while maintaining global responsibility. Whether this model becomes a role model or a cautionary tale will depend not only on results, but also on values.

Author: Nina Wojnar

From Egalitarianism to Welfare Chauvinism?

While Denmark’s welfare model remains a source of national pride, access to it is increasingly stratified. Recent reforms, such as a points-based family reunification system and reduced cash benefits for newcomers, illustrate the growing influence of what scholars call “welfare chauvinism” – the idea that access to social goods should be limited to members of a culturally defined national group.

As of July 2024, spouses seeking reunification must meet strict Danish language and financial criteria, making Danish regulations among the strictest in Europe. Critics say the policy disproportionately targets non-Western migrants, particularly from the Middle East and Africa, deepening socioeconomic divisions under the guise of cultural assimilation.

What’s more, Denmark accepted only 864 refugees in 2024, the lowest figure in decades – a number celebrated by some Danish officials as a success of their “zero asylum policy.” The position, which includes plans to outsource asylum processing to third countries such as Rwanda, has prompted criticism from EU legal experts and human rights organizations for violating the spirit of international refugee law.

Identity politics in a “progressive” democracy

How did one of the most socially progressive countries in Europe adopt the most restrictive migration policy?

The answer lies in a complex convergence of public sentiment, political strategy and national identity discourse. In Denmark, the migration debate is no longer just about economics or security – it is increasingly about who belongs to whom. This is the essence of identity politics in the Danish context: a political language that appeals to a shared sense of “Danishness,” understood in terms of cultural homogeneity, social norms and national cohesion.

The early 21st century saw the rise of the Danish People’s Party, which brought nationalist rhetoric into mainstream politics. But it wasn’t just the right that changed. Under pressure to retain working-class voters, the Social Democrats took an increasingly hard-line stance on migration, changing integration as a matter of cultural loyalty rather than social integration.

Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen’s administration represents the culmination of this political trajectory. Her government has combined ambitious social welfare spending with a firm, sometimes repressive approach to immigration. The so-called “ghetto laws,” aimed at dismantling “parallel societies,” have drawn harsh criticism for targeting neighborhoods with high concentrations of non-Western residents. 

Measures include forced relocation, increased police presence and double sentences for crimes committed in designated areas. In February 2025, the European Court of Justice’s legal advisor found the measures discriminatory, citing violations of EU anti-discrimination law.

Nevertheless, the policy remains popular. Polls show widespread public confidence in the government, and many Danes appear to view strong borders as consistent with liberal democratic values. Analysts suggest that this reflects a broader social belief: that maintaining the Danish model of prosperity requires a strict definition of national belonging – not just legally, but culturally.

As noted by political anthropologist Zachary Whyte, Danish identity politics is often formulated “not in terms of hostility, but in terms of preservation” – a desire to protect what is seen as a fragile social fabric in the face of globalization and demographic change. It is an identity politics not of division, but of defense.

Systems thinking: A tangle of governments, values and borders

A systems perspective helps to understand how national identity, EU-level policies and administrative governance co-create Denmark’s migration posture. Denmark’s exclusion from the EU’s Justice and Home Affairs pillar is central to its current autonomy over asylum and immigration. This special status stems from the 1992 referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, in which Danish voters initially rejected the treaty. To gain final approval in the second referendum, Denmark negotiated four “opt-out clauses,” including one on justice and home affairs. These opt-outs were later codified in the 1993 Edinburgh Agreement, giving Denmark the right to refrain from participating in EU cooperation on migration, asylum and judicial affairs – unless it chooses to do so on a case-by-case basis.

This legal and institutional arrangement allows Denmark to pursue a separate migration strategy, deviating from broader EU norms, while benefiting from EU labor mobility and trade regimes. The country is not part of the Schengen Asylum Procedures Regulation or the Dublin system, which frees it from mandatory refugee redistribution programs – unlike most other member states.

Paradoxically, however, Denmark remains deeply rooted in Europe’s labor mobility framework, which it uses to address its own demographic challenges. This includes bilateral agreements, such as the Mobility and Migration Partnership with India in 2024, to recruit foreign care workers to sustain an ageing population and reduce pressure on the welfare state. The contradiction is striking: openness to a global workforce while resisting humanitarian migration. Is this calibrated management of demographic and economic needs, or selective solidarity dressed up in technocratic language?

On the one hand, Denmark’s strategy seems to be working: low unemployment, good fiscal health and high trust in public institutions. Its integration efforts are praised for being orderly and firm. But on the other hand, the model raises difficult questions: at what cost is this internal stability achieved? And how sustainable is a system that selectively draws on European cooperation – accepting economic benefits while distancing itself from shared humanitarian responsibilities?

Diplomatic tensions and international reputation

For years, the Danish migration model has been held up as a model of pragmatism – a system that combined orderly integration with rigid borders. But that reputation is now being challenged, both in Brussels and on the broader global stage.

The turning point came in 2021, when the Danish parliament passed legislation allowing asylum seekers to relocate to third countries – particularly Rwanda – while their claims were being processed. Although no transfers have yet taken place, the policy has caused an uproar in the European diplomatic community. The European Commission issued an official warning, expressing concern that Denmark’s approach violates EU standards on asylum protection and could set a precedent, undermining the principle of non-refoulement.

Opposition did not stop at the EU threshold. International players have also reacted – some cautiously, others flatteringly. In Geneva, UNHCR called the regulations “deeply disturbing” and warned that such practices could undermine the global asylum system, especially if emulated by other countries. An agency spokesperson noted:

“Externalizing asylum obligations is not a sustainable or humane response to displacement…. We urge Denmark to reconsider this path.”

– UNHCR statement, June 2021.

In the UK, where a similar deal has been proposed with Rwanda, Danish officials have been quoted in the British media as informal “advisors.” However, even there, the criticism was fierce. At a parliamentary hearing in 2024, British MP Yvette Cooper argued that “the Danish model is misrepresented – it has not been successful and undermines Europe’s leadership on refugee rights.”

Meanwhile, countries such as Germany and the Netherlands, while refraining from public condemnation, have distanced themselves from Denmark’s tough stance. Dutch Foreign Minister Wopke Hoekstra subtly criticized such externalization agreements, stating:

“Solidarity in Europe means responsibility, not a transfer of our moral obligations.”

– Hoekstra, EU Council meeting, April 2024.

Even there, however, reactions were divided. Home Affairs Minister Suella Braverman, in a 2024 speech, praised Denmark’s position as “bold and forward-looking,” arguing that it showed the necessary “realism” regarding the limitations of the current asylum model.

“Denmark’s approach may not be perfect, but it takes into account the new era we live in. We can no longer afford a migration system designed for the 20th century.”

– Braverman, debate in the British parliament, January 2024.

Praise from Austria and Hungary was even more unequivocal. Austrian Interior Minister Gerhard Karner called the Danish model a “responsible, pragmatic solution” and expressed interest in exploring similar bilateral arrangements for processing asylum claims.

“The time has come for Europe to dare to rethink the rules – Denmark is showing the way,” he said.

– Karner, Vienna Migration Forum, 2024.

In Rwanda, government officials described the deal as a “strategic partnership for development” that will bring investment, jobs and international visibility. Rwanda’s foreign minister, Vincent Biruta, defended the agreement, stating:

“This is not a dumping agreement. It is a model of cooperation based on responsibility sharing.” 

– Biruta, press briefing in Kigali, 2023.

This emerging coalition of support, largely from countries facing political or public pressure to curb illegal migration, underscores the growing appeal of the Danish model – especially among those critical of EU-wide solutions.

However, legal opposition continues. In an advisory opinion dated 2025. The European Court of Justice found Denmark’s “ghetto law” to potentially violate EU anti-discrimination laws. The law mandates harsher penalties for crimes committed in areas described as “parallel societies,” which often have high populations of non-Western immigrants. The ruling – while not yet binding – has renewed scrutiny of Denmark’s national social cohesion policy, especially as the country continues to define itself as a leader in humanitarian aid and climate diplomacy.

From the outside, this duality is striking. Denmark remains a major donor to international development, an advocate for human rights and a key player in global climate governance. But beneath the surface of soft power, its hardline stance on migration reveals a more complex reality: a technocratic pragmatism that combines liberalism with selective exclusion.

“African nations should not be complicit in laundering European refugee commitments.”

– Elene Makena, Refugee Rights Kenya, 2023.

So the question remains: can Denmark credibly lead global justice while erecting bureaucratic walls against some of the world’s most vulnerable? Or is it simply ahead of the curve in transforming the way countries manage migration in an era of shifting geopolitics and domestic unrest?

Between principle and practice

The Danish migration model no longer fits the traditional image of Nordic openness and humanitarianism. Instead, it has evolved into a hybrid system – part welfare democracy, part fortress state – carefully calibrated to protect social cohesion while navigating the realities of political pressure and global displacement.

Instead of rejecting asylum altogether, the Danish state has sought to strategically transform access to protection. Policies such as externalization, selective integration and “signalling deterrence” are not just about exclusion – they also aim to maintain institutional trust, national legitimacy and the long-term sustainability of the welfare system. In this light, Denmark’s controversial position raises a legitimate, albeit uncomfortable, question: can it be a realistic response to the growing complexity of refugee flows and the dangers posed by unregulated migration routes and smuggling networks?

Proponents of the model point to its effectiveness: historically low numbers of asylum seekers, reduced pressure on services and a population that largely supports the government’s course. From this perspective, Denmark is not simply retreating from humanitarian values – it is redefining accountability in a way that prioritizes control, predictability and national consensus.

However, these benefits come at a diplomatic and ethical cost. Arrangements with autocratic regimes, increased use of detention and deterrence, and restrictions targeting specific communities can undermine both international commitments and the moral authority Denmark once enjoyed in global human rights discussions. Perhaps the deeper question is not whether Denmark’s model is “good” or “bad,” but whether it is inevitably heading in the direction that many European countries are heading. In a world where migration is increasingly politicized, Denmark may be less of an outlier and more of a reference point.

Whether this approach will strengthen the resilience of democracy or weaken it from within remains to be seen. But it undoubtedly reflects the tensions of our time: between principles and pragmatism, security and solidarity, borders and belonging.

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